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Abstract—In this work a scheme for key distribution and network access in a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) that utilises Identity-
Based Cryptography (IBC) is presented. The scheme is analysed on the ARM920T processor and measurements were taken for the
run time and energy of its components. It was found that the Tate pairing component of the scheme consumes significant amounts of
energy, and so should be ported to hardware. An accelerator was implemented in 65nm Complementary Metal Oxide Silicon (CMOS)
technology and area, timing and energy figures have been obtained for the design. Results indicate that a hardware implementation of
IBC would meet the strict energy constraint required of a wireless sensor network node.
Index Terms—Wireless sensor networks, identity based cryptography, hardware architecture
F
1 INTRODUCTION
R Ecent advances in radio and digital electronics haveenabled system on chip technologies to be developed
that will incorporate sensing, computation and communication.
These devices are known as wireless sensor nodes and are the
subject of very active research at present. It is envisaged that
eventually they will cost considerably less than one dollar,
and hence could be leveraged to provide a distributed WSN
containing many thousands of nodes [1]. The characteristics
that are attributed to wireless micro-sensors are that they have
limited memory, are very inexpensive, and have multi-year
life spans from a single power source. The total energy in the
power source for the wireless sensor node would be of the
order of 1000 joules [2]. Thus, it is imperative that the system
architecture of the nodes and the network as a whole should
be designed with an aim to minimizing energy dissipation in
all aspects of operation.
Even though the computational and sensing ability of an
individual node may be quite limited, the aggregated effect
of a large number of sensors working together would be to
provide a more accurate global picture of the spatial region in
which the sensors are placed than could be achieved through
conventional sensing technology. This opens up a whole vista
of scenarios where sensor networks could be deployed that up
until now could not be considered. Furthermore, it is clear that
in order for these networks to be deployed in real applications
that the issue of security is solved [3], [4].
One such application, where a WSN could play an important
role, is in environmental pollution monitoring. Chemical sen-
sors attached to devices with integrated Radio Frequency (RF)
transceivers could provide information on the toxic gas present
and also the position of the contaminant. Given the sensitive
nature of such sensing and potential repercussions associated
with it, security is extremely important in this application. This
• The authors are with CLARITY: Centre for Sensor Web Technologies,
Dublin City University, Ireland.
E-mail: kealan.mccusker@eeng.dcu.ie
Manuscript received April 19, 2005; revised January 11, 2007.
is the target scenario for this paper. The assumptions that are
made are that the network is static, the batteries of the devices
cannot be replaced and that the nodes are not protected by
tamper proof hardware. It is also assumed that the devices that
make up the network are homogeneous and have the ability
to determine their position by running a localisation algorithm
[5].
We believe that a symmetric key cryptosystem is appropriate
for communication between the nodes, though a pre-installed
system wide symmetric key or pair-wise keys stored on the
devices are not suitable for reasons of security and lack of
memory, respectively. Therefore an asymmetric or public key
system is required to establish the symmetric keys between
individual nodes.
With a traditional approach, if node A wants to communi-
cate with node B, it first has to receive B’s digital certificate
before it can send a message. When the two nodes are in direct
radio communication this will mean one transmission from B
to A. In the case of B being out of range of A, the digital
certificate would have to be relayed to A via intermediate
nodes. As the radio is likely to be the main consumer of
energy in the node, it is important to minimize the number of
transmissions. This can be achieved using IBC [6] in which
there is no need for a certificate to bind a node’s identity to
its public key, as the node’s identity can be used as the public
key.
There is a lot of related work that use IBC in the context of
WSNs [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. Doyle et al. proposed the
use of IBC for security in WSN [7]. They profiled the energy
required to run the Tate pairing on a 32-bit processor for a
curve over GF (2107) and arrived at a figure of 0.44J. This
work was carried out using simulation on a curve that would
not be considered secure due to the small field size.
Cheng et al. [8] present an IBC scheme based on the work
of Boneh-Franklin [13]. They do not propose the use of a
symmetric key crytosystem for WSN and hence are using their
IBC scheme for encrypting data. The Tate pairing will only
be required to be calculated once for a pair of nodes and can
be cached for future use in encryption and decryption. They
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do not investigate the energy usage of their scheme.
Oliveira et al. [9] present an implementation of the Tate pair-
ing on a 8-bit ATmega128L microcontroller used in the Mica
devices [14]. The time taken for the Tate pairing calculation
is 5.5s. They detail a scheme for key establishment based on
Identity-Based Non-Interactive Key Distribution Scheme (ID-
NIKDS).
Szczechowiak et al. [10] present a ID-NIKDS scheme
and also profile the Tate pairing on a range of different
wireless sensor nodes including the Imote2 [15]. Their fastest
implementation of the Tate pairing is 0.06s and it consumes
3.76mJ of energy. They present a scheme that defends against
node capture if most of the nodes only have the capability to
act as a data source.
The scheme proposed by Kim et al. [11] is based on devices
being present in the network that can act as security managers.
These security managers perform the expensive Tate pairing
calculation and the stated advantage of this system is that the
low-power nodes do not have to perform this task. As the WSN
envisaged in this work is made up of homogeneous nodes
then every device would have to perform the role of security
manager, if key establishment within the network is to be
achieved. Therefore this scheme would not be an improvement
over one based on ID-NIKDS.
Zhang et al.’s approach is similar to the one pursued in this
work, in that it also uses location in its security mechanisms
[12] . The security of their system is based on the fact that a
network master secret, that is used to generate location based
keys, is kept secret for a minimum time. This is the time that it
is believed that an adversary would require to access this key if
in control of the node. When the nodes have all calculated their
location based keys then this network master secret is securely
erased. Additional devices added to the network will require
access to this network master secret. This scheme’s security
depends upon keeping this network master secret secure.
It has been identified by previous work that IBC can provide
a mechanism for authenticated key agreement in a WSN. This
work follows this approach and also proposes a technique
that could be used to improve the resistance of the WSN to
node capture by maintaining a list of authenticated devices in
radio range. A method for adding nodes to the network and
removing them from the WSN is outlined. A low energy Tate
pairing accelerator is implemented and this, to the best of our
knowledge, is the first attempt at designing an accelerator for
minimising the energy of the pairing.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the Tate
pairing, a key component of IBC, and methods for calculating
it, are discussed in Section 2. In Section 3 the suitability
of different methods of key distribution for application in
WSNs are discussed. IBC is proposed as the most suitable
candidate for secure distribution of keys in the network.
A scheme for implementing key distribution and network
access in a WSN is described in Section 4. How the scheme
performs against well know attack is presented in Section
5. A software implementation of the scheme is profiled in
Section 6. In Section 7 the Galois field arithmetic units that
make up the Tate pairing are discussed and implemented in
hardware. Timing and energy figures for the various units are
also presented. The overall architecture for the Tate pairing
accelerator is presented in Section 8. The timing and energy
figures are compared against previous implementations and
software. Finally, a discussion of the results and conclusions
drawn are presented in Sections 9 and 10.
2 MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND
This work is concerned with applying IBC to solving the key
distribution problem in WSNs. In order to aid understanding
of later sections a brief mathematical summary of the area
is presented in this section. Further introductory material on
Elliptic Curve Cryptography can be found in [16].
2.1 Tate Pairing
The identity based cryptosystems discussed later in this thesis
are based on the hardness of the Bilinear Diffie Hellman
Problem (BDHP).
Definition 2.1 (Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem): Given
P, aP, bP, cP ∈ E(GF (2m)) it is computationally infeasible
to calculate el(P, P )abc ∈ GF (2mk), where E(GF (2m))
is a supersingular elliptic curve defined on the Galois field
GF (2m) and el(P, P ) is an application of the Tate pairing.
If l|#E(GF (2m)) where l is a large prime l, and k is the
smallest integer such that l | (2mk − 1) then the Tate pairing
is defined as [17], [18];
Definition 2.2 (The Tate Pairing): The Tate pairing, el, is
the mapping
el = E(GF (2
mk))[l]× E(GF (2mk))/lE(GF (2mk))
→ (GF (2mk))∗/(GF (2mk))∗l
= G1 ×G2 → GT
where the l torsion points, G1, are
E(GF (2mk))[l] = {P ∈ E(GF (2mk)) | lP = O}. (1)
And two points P,Q ∈ E(GF (2mk)) are members of the
same equivalence class, G2, if
P ≡ Q (mod E(GF (2mk))/lE(GF (2mk))) (2)
i.e. P = Q + lR where R ∈ E(GF (2mk)). Similarly a, b ∈
(GF (2mk))∗ are members of the same equivalence class, GT ,
such that
a ≡ b (mod (GF (2mk))∗/(GF (2mk))∗l) (3)
which can be also be stated as a = bcl for c ∈ (GF (2mk))∗.
Its most desirable property in the context of cryptography
is bilinearity
el(aP, bQ) ≡ el(aP,Q)b ≡ el(P, bQ)a ≡ el(P,Q)ab (4)
where a, b are integers. The exponent 2
mk
−1
l of the output of
the pairing provides a unique value rather than a member of
an equivalence class. The integer k is known as the security
multiplier and is four for the particular curve considered in
this paper.
The Tate pairing essentially takes two points on an elliptic
curve and maps them to a element of a multiplicative group
of a large finite extension field. The choice of the elliptic
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curve group over which the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm
Problem (ECDLP) is posed must be such that it requires at
least 280 operations to solve. Therefore l has to be at least of
the order of ≈ 2160. Also, the finite field to which the Tate
pairing maps must be sufficiently large to make the Discrete
Logarithm Problem (DLP) intractable i.e. that it has a running
time of 280. For a binary field, as used in this paper, it has to
be of the order of 21024 . As k = 4 for the curve used in this
paper, this means that m must be at least 250.
2.2 η Algorithm
Based upon the work of Duursma and Lee [19], a closed
form of the Tate pairing calculation, which is known as the η
algorithm, has been obtained for characteristic two [20], [21].
The Tate pairing is given by
fp(φ(Q))
2mk−1
l = gp(φ(Q))
22m−1 (5)
where
gp =
2m∏
i=1
l2
2m−i
2iP (6)
and l2iP is the equation of the tangent to the curve at the point
2iP . Through application of the distortion map, φ, and a lot
of algebraic manipulation Equation (7) is arrived at and this
is rewritten in the form of Algorithm 1.
gP (φ(Q)) =
m∏
i=1
x2
i
p x
2(−i+1)
q + y
2i
p + y
2(−i+1)
q
+ s2(x2
i
p + x
2(−i+1)
q ) + t
2 + 1
(7)
where s, t ∈ GF (2283×4). This algorithm requires seven
Algorithm 1 η Algorithm [20], [21]
P = (xp, yp), Q = (xq, yq) : P,Q ∈ GF (2283)
C(x) = c3x
3+c2x
2+c1x+c0 = 1 : C(x) ∈ GF (2283×4)
for i = 1 to 283 do
xp = x
2
p
yp = y
2
p
z = xp + xq
w = z + xpxq + yp + yq + 1
C(x) = C(x)(w + zx+ (z + 1)x2)
xq = x
2283−1
q
yq = y
2283−1
q
end for
return C(x) = C(x)2
2×283
−1
multiplications in the field GF (2m). It has a regular structure
that maps well to hardware, and it is the Tate pairing algorithm
that is implemented in this work.
3 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS IN A WSN
There is a clear need for security in a WSN. The main
requirements, known as confidentiality and network access
respectively, are that the data exchanged in the network should
not be read by an unauthorised third party and also that this
third party cannot join the network. The unique challenges
of WSNs is that the nodes have limited energy and radio
communication range, there is no device that can act as
a trusted server and their topology is not known before
deployment. The lack of a trusted server being present in
the network means that there are only three approaches to
distribute symmetric keys; standard public key schemes, IBC
or key predistribution. Standard public keys schemes are not an
apporpiate choice due to the extra communication overhead of
sending digital certificates as compared to the solution offered
by IBC. There are a number of different key predistribution
schemes and these are discussed below.
The simplest approach to deploy a symmetric system would
be that all the nodes share the same key. As the nodes could be
placed in a region where an adversary can capture them, it is
likely that it could extract the secret key, and therefore would
be able to monitor all communication in the network. For this
reason, this method of ensuring privacy is not appropriate in
a hostile environment.
Another method would be for all the nodes to set up pair-
wise keys between them before deployment. If there are n
nodes in the network then each node would have to store n−1
keys in its persistent memory. In a resource constrained device
this would be a problem as the size of the network would be
determined by the memory available. The other main drawback
to using this scheme is that it does not scale. If, after deploying
the bulk of the nodes, it is required to add extra nodes then
this is not possible unless the extra nodes’ keys are already
programmed in the deployed network. Upon capture of a node,
however, only its n − 1 links will be compromised, which is
a improvement on the system that uses only one symmetric
key.
Eschenauer et al. developed a key distribution technique
based on probabilistic key sharing [22]. In this approach a
large pool of keys is generated from which a smaller ring of
keys is randomly selected and preloaded before deployment
onto each node. Each node thus has a separate ring of keys
in which there may be a shared key. During the shared key
discovery phase of the algorithm neighbouring nodes ascertain
whether they share a key. If there is no path between nodes
in radio range there is a further path-key establishment phase
which make use of the already secure links to distribute pair-
wise key. It has been shown that in order to create a network of
10, 000 nodes the pool of keys has to be 100, 000 and the key
ring only has to be 250 [22]. This system is scalable as when a
new node is added to network it only has to be preloaded with
a random selection of 250 keys from the key pool. However,
this scheme is not secure against capture by an adversary. The
security of the probabilistic key sharing approach has been
improved by Chan et al. [23] who proposed that nodes need to
have q common keys. Probabilistic key sharing could impose
a large transmission overhead upon nodes during the initial set
up phase when path-keys are being established, and, due to its
probabilistic nature, it might not generate a complete network
when the nodes are sparsely dispersed.
Chan et al. also propose the random pairwise scheme where
they observed that a node does not need to store n − 1 keys
in order to establish a network [23]. Instead, it must store
np keys where n is the size of the network and p is the
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probability of any two nodes being connected such that a
complete network is established. In the initialization phase of
this scheme m distinct pairwise keys are placed on the nodes.
Upon deployment the nodes broadcast their IDs so that nodes
in communication range can ascertain whether they share a
common key. This scheme suffers from one of the drawbacks
of the naive pairwise scheme as it is not scalable.
Blundo et al. present a scheme for distributing conference
keys that could be used in WSN [24]. In this scheme a secret
symmetric bivarate polynomial, f(x1, x2), of degree k with
coefficients in GF (q) is selected by the programming entity.
Each node will be programmed with a unique identity and
this identity, i ∈ GF (q), is input to the polynomial giving
f(i, x2), which is then stored on the node. If two nodes wish
to establish a pair-wise key they insert the identity of the
device that they are communicating with into this polynomial
share. Each device will need to store a polynomial which
occupies (k+1)log2q bits of memory, thus potentially making
the memory a limiting factor on the size of the network.
This scheme is only secure as long as less the k nodes are
compromised.
The symmetric key distribution scheme of Blom et al. could
be applied to a WSN [25]. A k×n generator matrix, G, with
elements from GF (q) is selected, where n is the number of
nodes in the network. The secret k×k matrix, D, over GF (q)
is generated and is multiplied with G to give S = (DG)T .
Each node is assigned the ith row of S and ith column of G. If
two nodes now want to establish a shared key they exchange
their columns (i, j) in G and perform matrix multiplication
with the stored row of S resulting in an element of the matrix
K = (DG)TG. A shared key is generated as K is a symmetric
matrix and therefore Kij = Kji. This scheme is only secure
as long as k rows of S remain secret. As with the previous
scheme there is a requirement for the node to store a large
amount of keying material which in this case is (k + 1)log2q
bits.
Lui et al propose a technique that combines the work of
Blundo et al. with that of Eschenauer et al [26]. Instead of a
ring of keys on each node, a number of polynomial shares of
different bivariate symmetric polynomials are placed on the
devices. The nodes need to know what polynomial shares
are on adjacent devices in the network and techniques for
achieving this are outlined in the paper. Unlike the basic
probabilistic key sharing scheme, each pair of nodes will have
a unique key. But it is still a probabilistic technique with the
same problems as outlined above. A similar scheme based on
the work of Blom et al. is presented by Du et al. [27].
In comparison with other schemes IBC provides an simple,
scalable and secure, against individual node capture, method
of distributing symmetric keys. SOK ID-NIKDS was proposed
by Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara [28] and can be implemented
using the Tate pairing. If given h1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and two
devices with identity A and B respectively. Then QA = h1(A)
and QB = h1(B) where QA, QB ∈ G1. The nodes have
their private key sQA and sQB placed on them by the Key
Generation Centre (KGC). The symmetric key, KAB , can be
calculated by both parties as;
KAB = el(sQA, QB) = el(QA, QB)
s = el(QA, sQB) (8)
Thus, the memory requirement of this scheme is better than
the other key predistribution schemes as only the identity of
the node with which it will communicate is required. Key
authentication is also assured as only the KGC and a single
node will have a copy of the private key. A major drawback
of the using this approach is that an adversary could be able
to extract the keying material from a node and generate a
pair-wise key with any node in the network. Therefore key
distribution has to be combined with network access control
to prevent this happening, as outlined in the next section.
4 SCHEME
The scheme outlined here, for implementing key distribution
and network access control in a WSN, is designed for a static
network, and uses SOK ID-NIKDS and BMLQ Identity-Based
Signature (IBS) [29]. Environmental pollution monitoring is
the target application. In this case the nodes that are detecting
the pollution, such as chemical reagents have a fixed position
that they determine by running a localisation algorithm. End
users have to be able to easily extract data from the network
and this can be achieved using a Personal Digital Assistant
(PDA) type device. The scheme uses ID-NIKDS and IBS as
a method for distributing symmetric keys, and also to allow
devices access to the WSN.
We assume that the nodes themselves are not protected by
tamper resistant hardware as this would increase their cost.
Therefore it is possible that data and keying material on the
devices can be extracted. Also, the KGC, which programs the
devices, and the PDAs, which extract information form the
WSN, are secure. The end users of the WSN would be able
to find out if a PDA is lost and hence exclude that particular
device from the WSN. Communication between the KGC and
the network could be achieved remotely by using the extracting
device, such as a PDA, as a proxy. Before the extracting device
communicates with the WSN it could be programmed by the
KGC with messages that it wishes to broadcast to the network.
There are five distinct stages to this scheme; prior to
deployment, deployment, node addition, node removal, and
data extraction. Each one of these stages are outlined below.
4.1 Prior to deployment
This part of the scheme is concerned with distributing the
domain parameters and private keys to the nodes. The elliptic
curve and Galois fields being used are hard coded on the
device. For SOK ID-NIKDS the devices have to be able to
calculate KAB = el(sQA, h1(B)). For BLMQ IBS they have
to be able to generate a signature, S, and verify a signature,
V . Therefore, among the parameters that are placed on the
devices are
• (h2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zl)→ NX
• (h3 : {0, 1}∗ × µl → Zl)→ NX
• (Q ∈ G2, P = φ(Q) ∈ G1)→ NX
• (QPUB = sQ, g = el(P,Q))→ NX
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• (QKGC , QX , sQX)→ NX
where a generic node is given the identity NX and has public
key QX = h1(NX) and private key sQX . QKGC is the public
key of the KGC. Instead of placing h1 on the device, the hash
function is carried out by the programming device and the
point on the curve to which an identity equates is placed on
the node. For the rest of this section Q∗ represents the identity
of the node and also its public key.
4.2 Deployment
During this phase symmetric keys are set up between neigh-
bouring nodes in a pair-wise fashion. The nodes would trans-
mit a small signed message to every device in radio range at
time T1. This would means that devices that can generate a
valid signature are permitted to join the network. They would
then generate a pair-wise symmetric key, KAB . The nodes
maintain a list of authenticated devices in radio range.
• QA → QB : m||S(m)
• QB : V (m||S(m))
• QB : KAB = el(QA, sQB).
• Maintain list of nodes in radio range i.e. CB =
{QA, QC , QD}
Where KAB is a shared symmetric key between QA and QB ,
S represents signing and V represents verification.
4.3 Wireless sensor node addition
At time T3 extra devices may be added to the WSN. At a
previous time, T2, the KGC will broadcast though the network
the identity of the nodes to be added e.g. EKGC = {QO, QP }.
The identities of these devices, along with a time-stamp, are
signed by the KGC. It does this in order to authenticate these
identities and prevent the message, requesting the addition of
these identities, being replayed by an adversary in the future.
• QKGC → QX : QO||QP ||T2||(S(QO||QP ||T2))
• QX : V (QO||QP ||T2||(SsQKGC (QO||QP ||T2))
• QP → QX : m||S(m)
• QX : V (m||S(m))
• QX : KXP = el(sQX , QP ).
• QX : If QP /∈ EKGC then reject QP
else QP ∈ CX
4.4 Wireless sensor node removal
A node’s membership of the WSN can be revoked by the
following process. At time T2 the KGC will broadcast the
identity of the nodes to be removed i.e. EKGC = {QO, QP }.
The identities of these devices, along with a time-stamp, are
signed by the KGC in order to prevent a replay of the message.
• QKGC → QX : QO||QP ||T2||(S(QO||QP ||T2))
• QX : V (QO||QP ||T2||(SsQKGC (QO||QP ||T2))
• QX : If QO|QP ∈ CX remove QO|QP
4.5 Data extraction
In the environmental monitoring scenario it is envisaged that
the WSN itself would be static, but that the entities extracting
data from the network are mobile. For example, they could be
a member of the Environmental Protection Agency who uses a
PDA to extract information from the network. The PDA in this
case will be programmed with the same domain parameters
as the nodes. Only nodes authorised by the KGC can join the
network; hence the KGC needs to send a packet that contains
the identity of QPDA and is signed by its private key.
• QKGC → QX : QPDA||S(QPDA)
• QX : V (QPDA||S(QPDA))
• QX : KXPDA = el(sQX , QPDA).
When a PDA requests a reading, from a certain geographical
area, it will diffuse this request through the network. As its
identity QPDA has already been broadcast to the network as a
valid identity, then the node QX sends data back to the PDA
using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). This message
is encrypted by the pair-wise symmetric key (KXPDA) and
forwarded towards the extraction point, which is also known as
a sink. The encrypted message is also appended with a Keyed-
Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) generated using
the local symmetric pair-wise key (KAX) and sent to QA,
which is along the path to QPDA. QA checks the HMAC
and, if it is authentic, will generate a new HMAC using
the key KAB and forward the message to QB . This process
continues until the message arrives at the PDA, thus ensuring
that only devices that are members of the WSN can forward
the message. It is possible that nodes on the path to the sink
are compromised and could drop packets. This could be dealt
with at the routing algorithm level (there could be multiple
paths to the sink). A compromised node will not be able to
decrypt the message as they do not have the pair-wise key
(KXPDA) between the source and the sink.
5 SECURITY OF THE SCHEME
Various different attacks on a WSN are discussed in the
following section.
5.1 Erroneous Data Insertion
A compromised or malfunctioning node may introduce erro-
neous data into the network and this scheme does not protect
against this attack. Instead it is envisaged that the end user of
the WSN will have software that will ignore data from a node
that is not collaborated by other nodes in the same location.
5.2 Sinkhole Attack
In a sinkhole attack, a compromised device advertises a high
quality route to a data extraction point, when it is not near
one. This causes data to be routed to this malicious node,
which can then drop the packets. As the nodes are aware of
their position, this attack can be easily countered. If the device
injects false routing information, to say that it is close to a
distant area of the network, then as the nodes in the next
hop are aware of their own position they will know that this
could not be the case, and drop the packet. Also, if routing
information is replayed from another section of the network
then the receiving device will ignore the communication as the
device from which the routing information originally is not a
member of CX , where X is the node’s identity.
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5.3 Wormhole Attack
The wormhole attack [30] is where two devices, that are
not nodes, and are geographically distant, conspire with each
other to provide a low latency, undetectable (to the other
devices in the WSN) route between them that is known as
a wormhole. All communication between the source and sink
would go through this wormhole as it appears to be a short
path to the sink. The adversary could exploit this traffic to
drop packets. The scheme defends against this attack as a node
will only accept messages from a list of devices, CX , that it
is authorized to communicate with.
5.4 Sybil Attack
Sybil attacks [31] can be mounted by compromised devices. In
this attack the nodes present multiple identities to neighbour-
ing devices in order to disrupt routing, or provide multiple
readings to the network to make the local aggregated data
value erroneous. Under the scheme presented, this attack is
no longer feasible, as during normal operation the nodes only
accept packets from their neighbours in CX . During the node
addition phase they will only accept communication from
devices in EKGC .
5.5 Identity Replication Attack
Unlike the Sybil attack, the identity replication attack [32]
is based upon giving the same identity to different physical
devices. This attack can be mounted because in a WSN there
is no way to know that a node is compromised. If this device
is cloned and placed in different parts of the network with the
intention of disrupting the routing schemes then this attack
can be overcome with the security scheme, since the nodes
are only allowed to communicate with other devices that are
members of CX . Hence, if a compromised device is placed in
another part of the network it would not be able to join the
WSN at that point.
6 SOFTWARE PROFILE OF THE SCHEME
In order to evaluate whether a scheme based on SOK ID-
NIKDS and BMLQ IBS is an appropriate choice for a
WSN, the most computationally demanding components are
implemented in software using the Miracl library [33]. The
components that are profiled are exponentiation in the field
GF (2283×4) (power), elliptic curve point multiplication (mult)
and the Tate pairing (tate). In Table 1 the Tate pairing
contribution to the total is counted twice as it is used in
signature verification and symmetric key generation. The target
device is the ARM920T [34] as a similar processor is used on
the Imote2 device.
The code used to implement the scheme was compiled for
the ARM using the ARM Development Suite (ADS) v1.2. As
well as generating an executable that can be downloaded to
the ARM using the JTAG inputs, it also gives timing figures
for these executables.
The total energy dissipated is 35.4mJ and the power
consumed is 0.05W at 140MHz. The time required to run
the scheme algorithm at 200MHz is 444.5ms. Due to the
TABLE 1
Timing and energy figures for main components of the
scheme
code algorithm time (ms) energy (mJ)
tate (×2) el(P,Q) 177.1 14.1
power gx 39.8 3.2
mult rQ 50.6 4.0
Total 444.5 35.4
nature of the experimental setup these figures are a lower
bound of the energy dissipated by these component parts. The
energy measurements should be taken at 200MHz as this
will be the clock speed of the final system. This could not be
achieved as the fastest clock speed that the board on which the
measurements are taken on can run at is 140MHz. It can be
seen that a software implementation requires too much energy
and its latency is unacceptably large for implementation on a
node, therefore we believe that a hardware implementation of
this scheme should be investigated.
From analysis of table 1 it is clear that the Tate pairing
calculation is the most computationally demanding component
of the scheme. It requires 14.1mJ to run which is considerable
when the total energy budget of the nodes is of the order
of 1000J . A key design goal of nodes is that they operate
on a low duty cycle and the fact that the Tate pairing takes
177.1ms is counter to this goal. A hardware implementation
of the Tate pairing is therefore merited, as it will reduce the
time it requires and also the energy it dissipates.
The software implemention of the scheme was undertaken
in order to investigate whether a software solution of the Tate
pairing would suffice for a WSN application and, if not, to
identify key components that should be ported to hardware.
Recent results has shown that the software implementation
could be improved upon and significantly lower figures for
the latency and energy arrived at, though they also conclude
that a hardware implementation of pairings would be beneficial
[10].
7 ARITHMETIC OPERATIONS
All operations that are used for the various algorithms in the
hardware accelerator take place in binary extension fields; ei-
ther GF (2283) or GF (2283×4). If the Tate pairing calculation
is rewritten as in Algorithm 1, then the arithmetic operations
that are required are addition, multiplication, and inversion
in both fields. In addition, a circuit is required to perform
the squaring and square root operations in GF (2283), and
exponentiation in GF (2283×4).
For a design of this nature there is no real time constraint
and so there can not be a latency that has to be met. Power is
not important to this design, what is critical is the amount
of energy that the device consumes. As a Lithium battery
has a energy density of 2880J/cm3, which translates into
90µW/cm3/year [35], then this figure of 2880J could be
used as an energy constraint. It has been discussed previously
that the device must operate on a low duty cycle to conserve
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energy; this requires a circuit that completes its operation
quickly. At the same time the device should be as cheap
as possible, and this would mean that the techniques of
parallelism might not be appropriate as they will increase
the area and hence the cost. Finally, when the circuit is
operating it should consume as little energy as possible. These
sometimes conflicting design goals of latency, area and energy
are combined into a single metric known as area*energy*time
(AET) which will be used to evaluate the circuits outlined in
this work.
In the subfield GF (2) addition is carried out using modulo
two arithmetic, and hence can be performed in hardware
using an XOR gate. Addition is equivalent to subtraction in
GF (2). Also, multiplication is performed using an AND gate
in hardware.
The polynomial basis representation is used for the elements
of the two finite field such that for α ∈ GF (2283)
α = A(x) = a282x
282 + a281x
281 + · · ·+ a0 (mod f(x)),
∀aj ∈ GF (2).
(9)
When α ∈ GF (2283×4) then
α = A(x) = a3x
3 + a2x
2 + a1x+ a0 (mod p(x)),
∀aj ∈ GF (2283).
(10)
An irreducible polynomial (11) is chosen
f(x) = x283 + x119 + x97 + x93 + 1, (11)
such that it has an odd exponent polynomial which means that
the square root operation can be carried out in one clock cycle.
The polynomial for generating GF (2283×4) is
p(x) = x4 + x+ 1, (12)
and it is defined over GF (2283).
7.1 Addition
Addition in a binary extension field is trivial to implement in
hardware. It is an array of XOR gates, one for every two bits
of the operands that are to be added. Hence for GF (2283)
283 XOR gates are required, and for GF (2283×4) 1132 are
required.
7.2 Multiplication in GF (2283)
WSNs will be deployed in practice only if the devices that
make up the network are cheap. In terms of multiplication
in GF (2283) a fast bit-parallel multiplier is approximately
300,000 gates in area. This would be prohibitive in terms
of manufacturing cost for a wireless sensor node. Thus, a
bit-serial approach to designing the multiplier is warranted.
There are two approaches to a bit-serial multiplier – an Most
Significant Bit (MSB) first design or Least Significant Bit
(LSB) first design [36].
7.2.1 The MSB multiplier
The MSB multiplier is based on the following observation.
C(x) = A(x)B(x)
= (a282x
282 + · · ·+ a1x+ a0)(b282x282 + · · ·
+ b1x+ b0) (mod f(x))
= b0 + x(b1A(x) + · · ·x(b280A(x) + x(b281A(x)
+ (xb282A(x)) (mod f(x)))
(13)
From algorithm 2 it can be seen that this circuit will require
at least 283 clock cycles to complete.
Algorithm 2 MSB Multiplication in GF (2283)
Require: C(x) = A(x)B(x) (mod f(x))
C(x) = 0
count = 0
while count < 282 do
if B(282) = 1 then
C(x) = C(x) +A(x)
end if
left shift B(x)
C(x) = xC(x) (mod f(x))
count = count+ 1
end while
if B(282) = 1 then
C(x) = C(x) +A(x)
end if
return C(x)
7.2.2 The LSB multiplier
Another approach to bit-serial multiplication in GF (2283) is
to use a LSB multiplier. The LSB multiplier is based on the
following observation.
C(x) = A(x)B(x)
= (a282x
282 + · · ·+ a1x+ a0)(b282x282
+ · · ·+ b1x+ b0) (mod f(x))
= (b282x
282A(x) + · · ·+ b1xA(x)
+ b0A(x)) (mod f(x))
= (b282x
282A(x) (mod f(x))) + · · ·
+ (b1xA(x) (mod f(x))) + (b0A(x) (mod f(x)))
(14)
C(x) can be calculated using a shift and add algorithm where
the first partial product is b0A(x). B(x) is then shifted right
one bit while at the same time A(x) is multiplied by x and
reduced mod f(x). It is added to the previous product if b1 is
equal to one. The algorithm will terminate when the value of
the right shift register is equal to zero (see Algorithm 3). This
is an early exit mechanism, as it could finish after one clock
cycle or 283 clock cycles.
From an analysis of the algorithm it can seen that the
addition of right shift and linear feedback barrel shift registers
can be used to improve the performance of the circuit. Two,
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Algorithm 3 LSB Multiplication in GF (2283)
Require: C(x) = A(x)B(x) (mod f(x))
C(x) = 0
while B(x) 6= 0 do
C(x) = C(x) + b0A(x)
right shift B(x)
A(x) = xA(x) (mod f(x))
end while
three, four or five consecutive zero bits are searched for, and
the registers shifted accordingly. As there is a cost in terms
of extra area for every extra bit searched for, it was decided
that five would be the most bits considered. This is because the
probability of five zeros is 132 and the probability of more than
five zeros is low. The datapath circuitry is shown in Figure 1.
7.3 Multiplication in GF (2283×4)
Multiplication of two elements
γ = αβ, ∀α, β ∈ GF (2283×4)
is required. As the multiplication circuitry will exist for
GF (2283), it can be used to perform the multiplication for
GF (2283×4) using Karatsuba and Ofman’s algorithm [37].
This sharing of resources will lead to a decrease in the
monetary cost of the system.
As the elements are represented using the polynomial basis
(10). Then the multiplication is as follows.(
3∑
i=0
cix
i
)
=
(
3∑
i=0
aix
i
)(
3∑
i=0
bix
i
)
(mod p(x)) (15)
By applying the Karatsuba algorithm the resultant equation
is
c0 = a2b2 + (a1 + a3)(b1 + b3) + a0b0 + a3b3 + a1b1
c1 = (a2 + a3)(b2 + b3) + (a1 + a3)(b1 + b3)
+ (a0 + a1)(b0 + b1) + a0b0,
c2 = (a2 + a3)(b2 + b3) + a1b1 + (a0 + a2)(b0 + b2) + a0b0
c3 = a0b0 + (a0 + a1)(b0 + b1) + a1b1 + (a0 + a2)(b0 + b2)
+ (a0 + a2 + a1 + a3)(b0 + b2 + b1 + b3)
+ (a1 + a3)(b1 + b3) + a2b2 + (a2 + a3)(b2 + b3)
(16)
Using terms common to more than one equation i.e. a0b0 +
a1b1 it can be seen that 12 additions are required in GF (2283).
In total, 9 multiplications and 22 additions are required in
GF (2283) when the Karatsuba algorithm is employed.
The datapath circuitry is shown in Figure 2. The datapath
width is 283 bits wide. In order to reduce dynamic energy
dissipation, wires are held at a constant value when not in use.
This is accomplished through the signals enadd10 and enadd12
(not shown), which gate the inputs and the combinational
logic, respectively. The LSB multipliers clocks are to be gated
with their “done” signals. This technique takes advantage of
the early exit of the LSB multipliers due to their structure.
Fig. 1. mult lsb: Datapath circuit for the LSB multiplier in
GF (2283)
7.4 Squaring
The bit-serial multiplier described in Section 7.2 could be used
for squaring, but as squaring is used 283 times in each loop
and in the inversion circuitry, this is not the optimum choice.
Instead, a bit-parallel squaring circuit has been implemented.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING 9
Fig. 2. mult koa: Datapath circuit for the multiplier in
GF (2283×4)
For example, if given C(x), A(x) ∈ GF (24) then
C(x) = (A(x))2 (mod x4 + x+ 1)
= (a3x
3 + a2x
2 + a1x+ a0)
2 (mod x4 + x+ 1)
= a3x
3 + (a1 + a3)x
2 + a2x+ (a0
+ a2) (mod x
4 + x+ 1)
(17)
This can be implemented with two XOR gates and a reordering
of the inputs. With the aid of a C++ program this technique
can be applied to elements from GF (2283). The resulting
matrix can be converted into hardware using Very High Speed
Integrated Circuit Hardware Description Language (VHDL).
7.4.1 Square root circuit
Using the techniques of Fong et al [38], it is possible to reduce
the latency of the square root operation to one clock cycle.
Given
√
α = α2
m−1
(mod g(x)),
=
(
m−1∑
i=0
aix
i
)2m−1
(mod g(x))
(18)
where
g(x) = xm + xt + xu + xv + 1, (19)
and
α = am−1x
m−1 + am−2x
m−2 + · · ·
+ a1x
1 + a0 (mod g(x))
(20)
All of the exponents in Equation (19) are odd. Equation (18)
can be further developed as below;
√
α =
(
m−1∑
i=0
aix
i
)2m−1
=
m−1∑
i=0
ai
(
x2
m−1
)i
=
(m−1)/2∑
i=0
a2i
(
x2
m−1
)2i
+
(m−3)/2∑
i=0
a2i+1
(
x2
m−1
)2i+1
=
(m−1)/2∑
i=0
a2ix
i +
(m−3)/2∑
i=0
a2i+1x
2m−1xi
= αeven + αodd
√
x
(21)
From Equation (19) it can be seen that
1 = xm + xt + xu + xv (mod g(x))
x = xm+1 + xt+1 + xu+1 + xv+1 (mod g(x))√
x = x(m+1)/2 + x(t+1)/2 + x(u+1)/2
+ x(v+1)/2 (mod g(x))
(22)
Therefore
√
α = αeven+αodd(x
(m+1)/2+x(t+1)/2+x(u+1)/2+x(v+1)/2)
(23)
In the case of α ∈ GF (2283)
√
α = αeven + αodd(x
142 + x60 + x49 + x42) (24)
and the exponents are taken from Equation (11). This can be
implemented in hardware using XOR gates in one clock cycle.
7.5 Exponentiation
The only exponentiation that is required for the Tate pairing
calculation is β = α2283 where α, β ∈ GF (2283×4). This is
also known as the Frobenius map.
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Using Equation (10) the exponentiation is as follows;
3∑
i=0
bix
i =
(
3∑
i=0
aix
i
)2283
=
3∑
i=0
a2
283
i x
i2283
=
3∑
i=0
aix
i2283 (mod p(x)).
= (a0 + a1) + (a2 + a3)x+ a1x
2 + a3x
3
(25)
For a proof see [39].The Frobenius map can therefore be
implemented in hardware with two additions in GF (2283) and
reordering of the coefficients.
7.6 Inversion in GF (2283)
There are two well-known techniques for inversion of β ∈
GF (2283). One approach is based on Fermat’s little theorem
and the other uses the extended Euclidean algorithm.
7.6.1 Inversion by Fermat’s Little Theorem
Fermat’s little theorem (see Equation (26)) can be used to
invert an element of GF (2283)
β2
283
−1 ≡ 1 (mod f(x)). (26)
This means that β2283−2β ≡ 1 (mod p(x)) and therefore
β2
283
−2 is the inverse of β. The inverse of β can be calculated
with the square and multiply technique using the following
observations.
β−1 = β2
283
−2 = β2
1
β2
2
β2
3 · · ·β2282
= (· · · (((β)2β)2β)2 · · ·β)2 (27)
This algorithm requires 282 squarings and 281 multiplications
in GF (2283). From section 7.2 and 7.4, it can be seen that
multiplication in GF (2283) is a very expensive operation in
terms of time and energy. It would be beneficial to reduce
the number of multiplications. This can achieved using the
techniques of Itoh and Tsujii [40].
As
β−1 = β2
n
−2 =
(
β2
n−1
−1
)2
for a field GF (2n) then we can apply the following recursive
formula to reduce the number of multiplications. When n is
odd then
β2
n−1
−1 =
(
β2
n−1
2 −1
)2n−12
β2
n−1
2 −1 (28)
and when n is even
β2
n−1
−1 =
(
β2
n−2
−1
)2
β (29)
β−1 can now be decomposed using Equations (28) and
(29) resulting in only 11 multiplications and 282 squarings
are required to obtain the inverse of β. The datapath circuitry
is shown in Figure 3. 3.
Fig. 3. Datapath circuit for the inverter in GF (2283) using
Fermat’s little theorem
Algorithm 4 Extended Euclidean Algorithm for inversion in
GF (2283)[16]
Require: C(x) = A(x)−1 (mod f(x))
u = A(x), v = f(x), g1 = 1, g2 = 0
while u 6= 1 do
j = 0
if v > u then
u = v, v = u, g1 = g2, g2 = g1
else
j is equal to degree of u minus degree of v
end if
u = u+ xjv
g1 = g1 + x
jg2
end while
return C(x) = g1
7.6.2 Inversion by the Extended Euclidean Algorithm
The Extended Euclidean Algorithm is implemented using
algorithm 4. The datapath circuitry is shown in Figure 4. This
block uses the degree sub-block to measure the degree of the
polynomials u and v.
7.7 Inversion in GF (2283×4)
Fermat’s little theorem (see Equation (26)) can also be used
to get the inversion of an element α ∈ GF (2283×4) where the
extension field of GF (2283) is obtained using the irreducible
polynomial given in Equation (12). The technique below, that
has been used by Paar and Guajardo [41], is used as it makes
use of circuits that are already designed.
If the general case α ∈ GF (2mk) is considered, then the
inverse is
α−1 = α2
mk
−2 = α
2mk−1
2m−1 (2
m
−1)−1
= α r (2
m
−2)+r−1 = (αr)
−1
αr−1
where r = 2
mk
−2
2m−1 . The technique is based on the fact that
αr ∈ GF (2m), ∀α ∈ GF (2mk) (30)
When working in the field GF (2283×4) the first stage of the
inversion algorithm (5) is obtained by the following equations.
r − 1 = 2283 + (2283)2 + (2283)3.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING 11
Fig. 4. Datapath circuit for the inverter in GF (2283)using
the Extended Euclidean Algorithm
Algorithm 5 Inversion in GF (2mk)
Require: β = α−1
αr−1
αr = αr−1α
(αr)−1
(αr)−1αr−1
If we let
β = αr−1 = α2
283+(2283)2+(2283)3
where α, β ∈ GF (2283×4) this can be rewritten as
β =
((
α2
283
α
)2283
α
)2283
Three 2283 exponentiations (see section 7.5) and two mul-
tiplications in GF (2283×4) (see section 7.3) are required to
perform this operation. The next stage is multiplication in
GF (2283×4). As α ∈ GF (2283), (αr)−1 is inversion in
GF (2283) as outlined earlier in this section, and finally the
last step is multiplication in GF (2283×4).
The datapath circuitry is shown in Figure 5.
7.8 Results
Table 2 presents the results of all the circuits that have been
discussed in terms of their latency, energy, area and AET
metric. The operations are listed as follows; mult lsb* is the
LSB GF (2283) multiplier, mult msb is the MSB GF (2283)
multiplier, square is the squaring circuit, sqroot is the square
root operation, mult koa is the Karatsuba algorithm multiplier,
Fig. 5. Datapath circuit for the inverter in GF (2283×4)
inv ferm is the GF (2283) inverter and inv gf2m4 is the
GF (2283×4) multiplier.
The choice of the GF (2283) multiplier is crucial as it is the
building block upon which most of the other arithmetic opera-
tions are based. The area of the MSB multiplier (mult msb) is
0.024mm2, it has a latency of 2.32µs and consumes 3.94nJ
of energy. The area of the LSB multiplier (mult lsb1) is
0.022mm2, it has a latency of 2.31µs and consumes 4.46nJ
of energy. Therefore, this multiplier has 11% less area and
uses 13% more energy than the MSB multiplier. Using the
AET metric it can be seen that the differences between the two
approaches is less than 1%. From an analysis of the multipliers
presented in Table 2, where mult lsb2 represents the search
for the two LSB being zero etc., it can be seen that mult lsb3
has the lowest AET figure. This is the multiplier that is used
in this work.
It can be noted that the Karatsuba algorithm multiplier has a
latency of 1.93µs, which is comparable to the LSB multiplier
due to its parallel architecture. Also the results for the squaring
and sqroot circuit are of the same order.
The inverter based on Fermat’s little theorem (inv ferm) is
0.044mm2. It uses 68.1nJ of energy and require 22.65µs to
run to completion. From Table 2 it can be seen that the area
of the Extended Euclidean inverter (euclid) is 43% greater. It
is also an order of magnitude slower and uses two magnitudes
more of energy. Thus, by all the metrics used to evaluate
designs in this paper, the inverter based on Fermat’s little
theorem is the preferred choice for inversion in GF (2283).
8 TATE PAIRING ACCELERATOR ARCHITEC-
TURE
In this section the arithmetic units presented previously are in-
corporated into a Tate pairing hardware accelerator. A top-level
block diagram of the architecture of our proposed accelerator
is given in Figure 6. The device is connected with the host
using the Advanced Peripheral Bus (APB) scheme. The Host
Interface block interfaces with the APB. It is responsible for
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TABLE 2
Results for GF (2283) and GF (2283×4) arithmetic
primitives
operation area time time energy AET
(mm2) (µs) (cycles) (nJ) E-22mSJ
mult lsb1 0.022 2.31 289 4.46 2.24
mult lsb2 0.023 1.897 237 4.23 1.87
mult lsb3 0.025 1.776 222 4.14 1.8
mult lsb4 0.026 1.717 215 4.06 1.83
mult lsb5 0.028 1.708 214 4.15 2.01
mult msb 0.024 2.32 290 3.94 2.22
mult koa 0.295 1.926 241 43.4 247
inv ferm 0.044 22.65 2831 68.1 683
euclid 0.063 341.436 42680 1030 2.23E+05
inv gf2m4 0.417 29.863 3733 541 67500
square 0.005 0.008 1 0.004 1.60E-06
sqroot 0.008 0.008 1 0.004 2.47E-06
Fig. 6. Tate Pairing Hardware Accelerator Architecture
decoding the write data input signal and address signal to write
to the internal registers. The read data output is muxed in this
block with the control, status and resultant data from the Tate
pairing accelerator. These internal buses are gated when not
in use to conserve energy.
The control and status register block is used to implement
the control register, status register, and the read and write
data pointers. Accessing the data registers in this block has
the effect of updating the write or read pointers, which are
implemented as six bit counters. Writes and reads to the data
registers are in fact writes and read to registers in the Tate
block.
There are two clock domains in the design; the APB
clock which is PCLK and runs at 50MHz and a system
clock, tate clk, which runs at 200MHz. These clocks are
assumed to be asynchronous. Signals that cross the clock
boundary will require synchronisation and this is achieved in
the synchronisation block.
Finally, the Tate block implements the algorithm for calcu-
lating the Tate pairing using algorithm 1. Two points on the
curve are required to calculate the Tate pairing and these will
have coordinates in GF (2283). Therefore four 283 bit values
have to be written into the device before the Tate block can
be initiated. When it is finished it sends an interrupt back to
the host interface (tate intr).
8.1 Datapath
The datapath is presented in Figure 7. The databus is 283 ×
4 bits wide. The tate in register is arranged in 5 × 283 bit
registers that can be written to in 32 bit or 283 bit mode.
When the elliptic curve points are written into the accelerator
they are accessed in 32 bit mode by the processor via the host
interface block. When the operation is finished a “done” signal
is asserted which is assigned to an interrupt. Upon detection of
this interrupt the processor can read the output data, 32 bits at
a time, from the tate out register via reads to the tate data out
register.
The zw alu Arithmetic logic Unit (ALU) calculates z =
xp+xq and w = z+xpxq+yp+yq+1. Internally, it has two
squaring and square root circuits instantiated. It first is used
to calculate xp = x2p and yp = y2p. The tate alu ALU then
calculates xpxq. Then z and w can be arrived at. As well as
the above operations, this ALU also calculates xq = x2
283−1
q
and yq = y2
283−1
q .
The tate alu ALU calculates the multiplication in GF (2283)
and is also responsible for all other arithmetic operations
required by the algorithm such as; multiplication, inversion
and exponentiation – all in GF (2283×4). As was discussed
above, the inversion circuit in GF (2283×4) requires an inverter
in GF (2283) and this is implemented in this ALU.
There are two sub-circuits implemented in the tate alu; one
for calculating exponentiation and the other for multiplication
in both fields and inversion in GF (2283). This last circuit is
based upon the Karatsuba algorithm multiplier but with the
modification that one of the GF (2283) multipliers is replaced
by a module that performs inversion and multiplication in
GF (2283).
The datapath is controlled by a finite state machine (FSM)
with nineteen states. The data is written into the Tate block by
a write to the tate load bit in the control register, whilst at the
same time data is written to the tate data in register. A write
to the tate start bit in the control register initiates the FSM. It
executes 283 loops of the main body of the algorithm and this
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Fig. 7. Datapath for the Tate Pairing Hardware Accelera-
tor
is controlled by a counter. When the FSM is finished then the
tate done signal is asserted and this is recorded in the status
register and sent to the processor as an interrupt.
8.2 Experimental Results
The design was implemented using VHDL to be incorporated
in an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC). The
target technology is a Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing
Company (TSMC) 65nm low power CMOS process [42].
Worst case operating conditions are used and these are; voltage
1.08V , process 1.000 and temperature 125◦C. It is synthesised
for a clock of frequency of 200MHz. Synthesis and physical
synthesis is performed using Synopsys Design Compiler and
Physical Compiler, respectively [43]. Synopsys PrimePower
is used to arrive at a figure for the power consumption of the
circuit. Clock power was not included in this figure. Results
for the Tate pairing accelerator are shown in Table 3. From
this it can be seen that it has a latency of 0.7ms, an area of
0.574mm2 and consumes 29600nJ .
9 DISCUSSION
In terms of the overall system the inclusion of a hardware
accelerator for the Tate pairing will lead to a 79% reduction
in latency and energy when compared with running the scheme
TABLE 3
Results for the Tate pairing accelerator
operation area time time energy AET
(mm2) (µs) (cycles) (nJ) E-22mSJ
tate 0.574 698.11 139622 29600 1.19E+08
in software. Even with this improvement in performance, it is
evident, with the scheme still taking 91.7ms and consuming
7.3mJ , that these percentage drops are not enough to justify
the deployment of IBC in a WSN. Further significant improve-
ments can be attained if the power operation (gr) and the mult
operation (rP ) were also accelerated. Assuming that the same
reductions in latency and energy consumption can be attained
as for the Tate pairing calculation, then the figures are as in
Table 4. As the time for running the scheme is now 1.75ms
TABLE 4
Effect of accelerating on IBC scheme
none Tate Tate/rQ/gr
value value decrease value decrease
energy 35.4mJ 7.26mJ 79.5% 0.08mJ 99.8%
time 444.5ms 91.7ms 79.4% 1.75ms 99.6%
and it consumes 0.08mJ of energy, then it is probable that
the latency and energy figures for the scheme would be in
appropriate range for a WSN.
There are several groups which have implemented the Tate
pairing in hardware but are targeting the latency metric and
also Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) rather than
energy and an ASIC, therefore these contributions are not a
valid comparison with this work [44], [44], [45], [46], [47].
The recent work of Szczechowiak el al. has the lowest reported
energy figure for a software implementation of the Tate pairing
which is 3.76mJ for the Imote2 [10]. This is, as would be
expected, several magnitudes higher than what is achieved by
implementing the pairing in hardware, and too high for the
limited energy available to a node.
10 CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a solution for distributing symmet-
ric keys and network access control in a WSN using IBC. The
proposed scheme was evaluated against well known attacks
on a WSN and found to perform well. It was then profiled in
software, and the most computationally demanding component
of the scheme, the Tate pairing, was ported to hardware.
We presented our hardware design for the Tate pairing and
evaluated it against key metrics. Experimental results indicate
that whilst this work represents significant progress in terms
of implementing security in a WSN, further work is needed
in order to implement other components of the scheme such
as the elliptic curve point multiplication and exponentiation in
the field GF (2283×4).
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